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Tax corruption and private sector development 
in Vietnam* 
 
Ngoc Anh Nguyen,1 Quang Hung Doan2 and Binh Tran-Nam3 
 
 
Abstract 
This article aims to examine the impact of tax corruption on private sector development in Vietnam.  It is motivated by two 
separate but related considerations.  First, despite the seriousness of the phenomenon of corruption, there is a paucity of 
rigorous empirical research of corruption, particularly tax corruption, in Vietnam.  Secondly, ineffective control of corruption 
is viewed as a cause of Vietnam’s recent total factor productivity (TFP) slowdown or its poor industrial policy, both of which 
may hamper Vietnam’s progress as a low middle-income country.  Without some understanding on the impact of tax 
corruption on the economy, it may not be possible to devise the most effective anti-corruption policy and measures. 
After a brief literature review that focuses on tax corruption, various conceptual issues relating to tax corruption are discussed 
and clarified.  The extent of petty tax corruption in Vietnam is then discussed, followed by a review of findings and 
implications of recent studies on how tax corruption impacts on private sector development in Vietnam.  Despite perceptions 
and evidence of widespread petty tax corruption, Vietnam ranks very highly both in terms of tax collection and tax effort.  
Not unexpectedly, the impact of tax corruption is mixed in the sense that empirical evidence lends credence to both ‘sanding 
the wheels’ and ‘greasing the wheels’ hypotheses.  Finally, some broad policy recommendations for combating tax corruption 
are offered. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT 
Vietnam’s transition from an inward-looking, centrally-planned economy to an 
outward-looking, market-based economy formally commenced in 1986 although 
substantial, irreversible changes only took place in 1989 (World Bank, 1993, pp. i-ii).  
After three decades of economic reform, Vietnam has achieved certain commendable 
outcomes, especially in terms of economic growth, poverty reduction and 
macroeconomic stability.  From being one of the 30 poorest countries in the world in 
the early 1990s,4  Vietnam has recently become a middle-income country (World 
Bank, 2013a) thanks to its steady growth rate since economic reform.5  Overall, it is 
an emerging transition country with a sizeable population6 and a dynamic economy 
with expanding international and investment trade ties.7 
Despite these achievements, Vietnam has been facing a number of social, economic 
and political challenges such as productivity slowdown, widening income and wealth 
inequality, diminished environmental sustainability and, perhaps most seriously, 
corruption.  While the phenomenon of corruption is widespread across countries and 
over time, it has been perceived by many different stakeholders as one of the most 
critical issues facing Vietnam at present (World Bank and Government Inspectorate of 
Vietnam, 2012).  More specifically, the Communist Party of Vietnam has long 
identified corruption as a threat to its political legitimacy (Communist Party of 
Vietnam, 2006).  Yet, despite a strong anti-corruption legal framework since 2005, 
very limited results have been achieved (Transparency International, 2017a). 
In the above context, the principal aim of this article is to examine the impact of tax 
corruption on private sector development in Vietnam.  The article is motivated by two 
separate but related considerations.  First, despite the seriousness of the phenomenon 
of corruption, there is a paucity of rigorous empirical research of corruption in 
Vietnam.  Further, there are hardly any studies that specifically focus on tax 
corruption although some studies nevertheless touch on some aspects of tax 
corruption.  Secondly, there is an increasing concern in Vietnam that the country may 
fall into the ‘middle income trap’.  In this sense, many researchers have blamed 
ineffective control of corruption as a cause of Vietnam’s recent total factor 
productivity (TFP) slowdown (see, for example, Vu, 2016) or its poor industrial policy 
(Ohno, 2016, p. 35).  Without some understanding of the impact of tax corruption on 
the economy, it may not be possible to devise the most effective anti-corruption policy 
and measures. 
The scope of this article is limited to tax corruption that involves at least one tax 
official.  Illegal business practices involving firms only (e.g., one business issuing fake 
value added tax (VAT) invoices to another business) do not constitute tax corruption 
                                                          
4 In terms of GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) dollar terms, Vietnam was ranked among 
the 30 poorest countries in the world in 1990 when estimates of its GDP per capita in PPP dollars first 
became available; see various issues of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human 
Development Report. 
5 Vietnam’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 7.2 per cent in the first decade of the 21st century 
(World Bank, 2012). 
6 Vietnam’s population in 2015 was estimated at about 93.4 million, making it the 14th most populous 
country in the world (United Nations, 2015, p. 17, Table 5.1). 
7 Vietnam’s trade-to-GDP ratio decreased from 157.4 per cent in 2008 to 130.7 per cent in 2009 but then 
rebounded to 147.6 per cent and 164.8 per cent in 2010 and 2011, respectively (World Bank, 2013b). 
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for the purposes of this article.  Furthermore, due to data limitations, the empirical 
examination is confined to petty tax corruption, i.e., relatively small 
‘unofficial/informal’ payments (bribes) made to tax officials during the process of 
assessing and collecting tax revenue in Vietnam.  The article focuses on the impact of 
petty tax corruption on the private sector, which is widely considered to be the engine 
of growth and development in Vietnam in the long run.8  Finally, the development of 
the private sector is studied in terms of four dimensions: innovation, investment, 
employment and per capita income. 
The remainder of this article is organised as follows.  Section 2 presents a brief 
literature review on tax corruption, including some recognised Vietnamese studies 
(available in English).  In section 3, various conceptual issues relating to tax 
corruption are discussed and clarified in order to prepare the ground for the discussion 
that follows.  These include definition and types of tax corruption, its measurement, 
and its causes and consequences, mainly from a Vietnamese perspective.  Section 4 
reviews the extent of tax corruption in Vietnam while section 5 presents an overview 
of private sector development in Vietnam, and then discusses the implications of 
empirical findings on how tax corruption impacts on private sector development in 
Vietnam.  Despite the perception and evidence of widespread petty tax corruption, 
Vietnam ranks very highly both in terms of tax collection and tax effort.  Not 
unexpectedly, the impact of tax corruption on private sector development is mixed in 
the sense that empirical evidence lends credence to both the ‘sanding the wheels’ and 
‘greasing the wheels’ hypotheses.  The final section offers some summary remarks 
and proposes various recommendations for mitigating tax corruption in Vietnam. 
 
2. BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW ON TAX CORRUPTION 
The economic literature on corruption is long-standing and very substantial (see, for 
example, Leff, 1964; Mauro, 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000; Kaufmann, Kraay & 
Mastruzzi, 2011).  A significant proportion of this literature is devoted to economic 
growth and development.  In this context, two opposing hypotheses, namely that 
corruption ‘sands the wheels’ and ‘greases the wheels’ of growth, have been 
theoretically established and empirically tested.  The results obtained to datefrom 
these empirical tests have been mixed (see the reviews in this field by Méon and 
Weill, 2009, and Nguyen, Nguyen and Tran-Nam, 2016).  Since the literature on 
corruption in general has been well discussed elsewhere (see, for example, Rosid, 
2017) and in view of the focus of this article, it suffices to focus on the literature on 
tax corruption. 
By definition, tax corruption is a strict subset of corruption.  Furthermore, tax 
corruption is necessarily intertwined with tax evasion (and tax avoidance to a lesser 
extent) because taxpayers who bribe are often motivated by tax evasion/avoidance and 
tax officials who receive bribes will find it necessary to hide their receipt of illegally 
                                                          
8 The term ‘private sector’ is employed in this article to mean the non-state sector. In Vietnam, the non-
state sector is divided into the private (i.e., domestic private) sector and the Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI, i.e., international private) sector.  
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obtained income.  Thus, tax corruption involves a very important intersection of 
corruption and tax evasion. 
There are several strands of research on tax corruption that can be identified in the 
general literature on tax corruption.  These areas are: (i) determinants of tax 
corruption; (ii) impact of corruption on tax compliance including firm tax evasion; and 
(iii) strategies to reduce tax corruption.  Each of these strands will be briefly 
considered in turn. 
2.1 Determinants of tax corruption 
Richardson (2006a) examined the influence of culture (proxied by power distance,9 
individualism, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity) on petty tax corruption 
(irregular payments or bribes).  Based on sample data of 47 countries drawn from the 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Reports 2002-04 and other sources, 
and after controlling for economic development (bureaucratic compensation), size of 
government and democracy, it was found that the higher the level of power distance 
and uncertainty avoidance, the higher is the level of petty tax corruption in a country.  
While those findings are plausible, the potential endogeneity between tax corruption 
and uncertainty avoidance casts some doubts on the strict applicability of the OLS 
estimation employed by that author. 
In a similar study, Richardson (2006b) studied the influences of the level of tax 
evasion, tax law complexity and level of self-assessment on petty tax corruption.  
Based on sample data of 48 countries drawn from a wide range of sources (mainly the 
Global Competitiveness Reports 2002-04), and after controlling for the three 
economic and political variables mentioned above plus the top marginal individual 
income tax rate, it was found that the lower the level of tax evasion and tax law 
complexity, and the higher the level of self-assessment, the lower is the level of petty 
corruption.  Again, while the results are sensible, it is unclear to what extent the 
potential endogeneity between petty tax corruption and tax evasion undermines the 
OLS estimation results obtained. 
2.2 Impact of corruption on tax compliance 
There is a series of studies examining the impact of corruption on tax compliance.  
This relationship has been found to be negative in practically all cases.  For example, 
using an international cross-section of 30 developed and developing countries, Pincur 
and Riahi-Belkaoui (2006) showed that individual tax compliance internationally is 
negatively related to the control of corruption.  Similarly, based on a sample of over 
5,000 firms from 22 former Soviet Bloc transition economies (extracted from the 
World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s 2005 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)), Alon and 
Hageman (2013) found that a higher level of corruption is associated with a lower 
level of firm tax compliance.  Utilising micro-level data from the Afrobarometer 
Survey Wave 5 (covering 35 African countries, mostly from the sub-Saharan region, 
during the years 2011-13), Jahnke (2015) demonstrated that personal experiences of 
petty corruption not only directly lower tax morale (willingness to pay taxes) but also 
                                                          
9 Power distance refers to how paternalistic the relationship between superiors and subordinates is.  The 
more paternalistic, the higher is the power distance. 
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indirectly affect tax morale via reduced trust in the tax collection agency.  While these 
studies used corruption overall as a determinant, it seems plausible that the same 
results would hold when corruption is substituted by tax corruption. 
More recent studies of corruption and firm tax evasion have explicitly recognised the 
interaction between corruption and tax evasion.  Based on firm-level data obtained 
from the World Enterprise Survey and BEEPS covering 8,000 observations and 32 
countries, Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and McClellan (2016) applied the instrumental 
variable method to control for the potential endogeneity of corruption and tax evasion.  
As a robustness check, the method of propensity score matching was also employed.  
Their results indicated that it is corruption that largely drives tax evasion, in that: (i) 
requests for bribes reduce reported taxable sales, and (ii) larger bribes result in higher 
levels of tax evasion.  In a theoretical study of business culture and tax evasion, Çule 
and Fulton (2009) constructed a coordination game to show that multiple equilibria 
can exist.  In an unfavourable equilibrium (high cheating and corruption), increases in 
auditing or penalties may have perverse impacts and increase tax evasion.  An 
externality between firms and tax inspectors is the source of this perverse effect: more 
tax evasion by firms is good for bribe-taking inspectors and more bribe-taking 
inspectors are good for tax evading firms. 
2.3 Strategies to combat tax corruption 
In terms of combating tax corruption, the literature is not consistent in its findings and 
implications.  For example, in an early contribution, Flatters and MacLeod (1995, p. 
397) proposed that ‘[s]ome tolerance of corruption can be part of an efficient 
collection system, especially when there are constraints on government wages or effort 
is required to learn payers’ tax liabilities’.  In contrast, Fjeldstad and Tungodden (2003) 
put forward an opposite argument on three grounds.  First, while an increase in 
corruption may raise tax revenue in the short run, the opposite result generally holds in 
the long run.  Secondly, the value of reducing corruption exceeds that of reduced tax 
evasion and higher revenue.  Thirdly, eliminating corruption should be viewed as an 
end, not a means, in itself. 
Turning to Vietnam, the literature on corruption has only recently emerged due to the 
sensitivity of the issue and lack of systematic data until about a decade ago.  As a 
result, there has been very little research on corruption, let alone tax corruption, in 
Vietnam.  An interesting study that deserves mention is that by Rand and Tarp (2012) 
who investigated the determinants of bribes and changes in bribe-paying behaviour by 
Vietnamese firms.  Applying a pooled probit model and a fixed-effect linear 
probability model to firm-level data obtained from the United Nations University’s 
2005 and 2007 Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprises Surveys (VSMES) covering 
1,659 firms in 10 provinces, Rand and Tarp (2012) found that: (i) bribe incidence 
among SMEs in Vietnam is closely related to firm-level differences in sunk costs and 
ability to pay; (ii) the magnitude of bribes is higher for firms that get preferential tax 
benefits and government contracts, and (iii) there is evidence indicating a decline in 
firm-level corruption from 2005 to 2007. 
During 2013-14 the UK Department for International Development (DFID) sponsored 
an anti-corruption research program in Vietnam (see Tromme, 2016).  The program 
involved a series of empirical studies utilising a variety of research methods and data 
sources.  These studies examined the impact of corruption on economic growth 
(Nguyen, Nguyen & Tran-Nam, 2016), provincial development (Dang, 2016), firm 
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innovation (Nguyen, Doan, Nguyen & Tran-Nam, 2016), firm strategy (Nguyen, Ho, 
Le & Nguyen, 2016) and household business sector (Dang et al., 2016).  They were 
published in a special issue of Crime, Law and Social Change in 2016 and have 
remained the most comprehensive, up to date and authoritative set of studies on 
corruption in Vietnam.  While most of these studies are concerned with general 
corruption, the findings can plausibly carry over to tax corruption.  In the only study 
that focused on tax corruption, Dang et al. (2016) found that: (i) bribes result from 
both extortion and collusion, and (ii) bribe payments are often perceived as a normal 
cost of doing business. 
 
3. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
Before proceeding further, it is useful to clarify key concepts and theoretical 
relationships.  To this end, we shall in turn discuss the meaning, measurement, causes 
and consequences of tax corruption. 
3.1 Definition and types of tax corruption 
Like needs and poverty, corruption is a social concept so that its meaning is not only 
relative but also context dependent.  What is considered as corruption at a particular 
place and time in a particular context may not be regarded so at a different place and 
time or in a different context.  The meaning of corruption is comprehensively 
reviewed in Rosid (2017, ch. 3).  While corruption can be defined in various ways, 
there is nevertheless a near-universal agreement on two essential characteristics of 
corruption, namely: (i) illegal/illegitimate use/exercise (or misuse/abuse) of public 
office/power, and (ii) private/personal gains/benefits.  Note that, especially in the 
context of developing/transition economies, these benefits consist of not only financial 
but also non-financial rewards.  Not surprisingly, corruption often goes hand in hand 
with nepotism and cronyism in these countries. 
For a variety of purposes, it is necessary to adopt a formal definition of tax corruption.  
To this end, tax corruption is defined as the ‘behaviour on the part of tax officials to 
improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, or those close to them, by the misuse of 
the public power entrusted to them’ (Li, 1997, p. 475).  This definition seems to be 
precise yet sufficiently broad to capture the various characteristics of tax corruption 
discussed above.  More importantly, it explicitly mentions the benefits to people who 
are close to the corrupted tax officials.  This is most relevant in countries such as 
China or Vietnam where the traditional culture encourages sharing, especially among 
members of the extended family or local community.10 
In terms of the operation of the tax system, one may, in principle, distinguish between 
tax policy corruption, tax administration corruption and tax dispute resolution 
corruption.  Tax policy corruption represents an example of the classification of 
‘political’ corruption by Transparency International.  This refers to ‘a manipulation of 
policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and 
financing by political decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, 
                                                          
10 There is a Vietnamese saying that ‘One mandarin helps the whole clan’ (Một người lảm quan cả họ 
được nhờ). 
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status, and wealth’ (Transparency International, 2017b).  However, it is generally not 
possible to find evidence of tax policy corruption in practice.  This is especially true 
for Vietnam in view of the consensual-based decision-making process at the national 
level (Lucius, 2009, p. 13).  Vietnam is a civil law country in which the courts play a 
very insignificant role in resolving tax disputes so the scope for tax dispute resolution 
corruption is negligible.  Thus, in practice, all empirical studies of tax corruption 
necessarily focus only on tax administration corruption.  Thus in this article, from this 
point on, tax corruption refers to tax administration corruption, unless otherwise 
stated. 
In terms of scale, tax corruption can be divided into petty and grand (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2008, p. 6).  Petty tax corruption refers to the bribes 
(known in Vietnam as informal or unofficial payments) received by relatively low-
level tax officials (tax inspectors/auditors) in their interaction with taxpayers 
(individuals and firms).  Grand tax corruption, on the other hand, refers to the abuse of 
public power by high-level tax officials, such as directors or senior staff, for their 
personal gains.  Grand tax corruption occurs much less frequently but involves much 
larger sums of money than petty tax corruption.  In view of the lack of concrete data 
on grand tax corruption in Vietnam, tax corruption in this article from now on will 
refer to petty tax administration corruption, unless otherwise stated. 
In terms of process, petty tax corruption can be further classified into extortion and 
collusion.  In the case of collusion, the bribery is often suggested by the taxpayer and 
the amount is normally arrived at after a process of negotiation, whether explicitly or 
implicitly.  In the case of extortion, it is the tax official who first makes the demand 
for the bribe.  In both cases, the amount of the bribe tends to be proportional to the 
amount of taxation that is in dispute. 
In the literature, the bribe-taking behaviour of tax officials is supposed to be 
conducted in an isolated and independent manner, and the bribes normally take the 
form of cash or gifts.  In Vietnam, there is a range of anecdotal evidence that tax 
corruption appears (or at least is perceived) to be widespread, loosely organised and 
taking many forms.  More specifically, tax-related bribes often go hand in hand with 
nepotism and favouritism (i.e., appointment of inappropriate candidates due to their 
family ties or close relationships with the Communist Party of Vietnam, etc.) 
Because of the many forms of tax corruption in Vietnam, it can still take place in 
isolation.  In terms of interaction between tax officials and taxpayers, tax corruption 
can be further divided into the following categories: 
1. one tax official in isolation: embezzlement, inappropriate 
appointment/promotion of tax officials (due to bribery, family ties, political 
connection, etc) or revealing sensitive tax information to the wrong party; 
2. one or more tax officials and one taxpayer: bribery (cash, gift, renting or 
buying assets below market prices, paying for private expenses such as meals 
or tours) or recruitment/promotion of persons related to the tax official(s) in 
the taxpayer’s business; 
3. two or more officials: excessive gifts to curry preferential treatments (e.g., 
appointment of relatives, own promotion) from superiors or an informal 
scheme of bribe-sharing between tax officials. 
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It is noted that while the above classification also applies to general corruption, the 
frequency and scale of bribery are most severe in the case tax corruption, at least in 
the context of Vietnam. 
3.2 Measurement of tax corruption 
For any given specific definition of tax corruption, exact measurement of tax 
corruption is impossible for a number of obvious reasons.  First, due to its secret and 
illegal nature, direct and systematic observations of tax corruption are not possible.  
Secondly, as discussed previously, tax corruption has several different dimensions and 
it may not be possible to combine these aspects into a single measurement or index.  
Thus, it is very problematic to arrive at a set of measures of tax corruption which are 
comparable across countries and consistent over time. 
Broadly speaking, there are two different approaches in measuring tax corruption, 
namely objective measurement and subjective measurement.  An objective 
measurement of tax corruption may include, for example, the frequency and the 
amount of bribery that a taxpayer makes to tax officials.  Such information can in 
principle be collected from taxpayers through the means of a questionnaire- or 
interview-based survey.  In addition to the conventional data problems arising from 
survey research, it is unclear whether respondents truthfully reveal the full extent of 
their bribery behaviours.  An objective measurement of tax corruption can be further 
categorised into an absolute measure (e.g., the average dollar value of the tax-related 
bribes) or a relative measure (e.g., the ratio of bribe payments to official tax liability or 
the ratio of bribe payments to firm’s total costs or profits).  
A subjective measurement of tax corruption seeks to obtain (normally informed) 
views/perceptions of relevant stakeholders such as tax officials, business entities, 
institutional agencies (including donors) and individuals through questionnaire-based 
surveys.  This is by far the most widely-used approach in gauging the level of tax 
corruption in countries around the world, including Vietnam. 
Objective and subjective measurements of tax corruption discussed above constitute 
direct measures of tax corruption.  An additional means to assess the extent of tax 
corruption is to rely on a set of indirect measures, which can be either objective or 
subjective.  For example, it is well known that tax corruption often occurs as a result 
of the interaction between tax officials (inspectors and auditors) and taxpayers.  Thus, 
in the case of tax corruption, indirect measures may include the Paying Taxes 
indicators compiled by the World Bank.  Similarly, aggregate measures such as tax 
collection (tax revenue/GDP) or tax effort (to be further discussed later, in section 4.3 
below) can also be loosely used as indirect, macro measures of tax corruption. 
3.3  Causes of tax corruption 
There is a variety of general and specific causes of tax corruption in Vietnam.  Since 
most of the general causes have been well-discussed in the literature, it suffices to 
mention them only briefly here. 
3.3.1 General causes: 
1. political: lack of transparency, accountability and genuine will to fight 
corruption; 
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2. institutional: lack of a competent public sector; no objective measure of public 
sector performance; job-buying practice in the public sector; 
3. cultural: sharing within the extended family of local community; 
compromising and paternalistic culture; 
4. economic: low wages in the public sector (no public servant can survive on 
his/her official salary!). 
3.3.2 Specific causes: 
1. tax law complexity: tax law can be interpreted in different ways (under the 
civil code approach, Vietnam’s tax law cannot cover all cases that may arise 
in practical situations); 
2. tax discretions: tax officials have many discretions (e.g., assessing turnover 
for the purposes of presumption taxes);  
3. tax administration: no self-assessment, frequent site visits to business 
taxpayers, no effective system of independent tax dispute resolution; 
4. business practice: poor tax and accounting record-keeping; 
5. business motive: desire to pay as little tax as possible. 
3.4 Consequences of tax corruption 
Tax corruption gives rise to a number of harmful consequences on social welfare and 
economic development (see, for example, Purohit, 2007).  First, and most apparently, 
tax corruption causes a loss in the tax revenue collected.  This revenue leakage is 
particularly damaging to developing and transition economies which rely heavily on 
tax revenue for the provision of much needed public goods and services for economic 
development such as health and education. 
Secondly, and also quite obviously, tax corruption causes distortion in the allocation 
of resources, including the allocation of talents.  Together with other forms of 
corruption, it reduces the efficiency of both the private and public sectors, and 
decreases the inflows of foreign direct investment.  At the firm level, the costs and 
benefits of corruption are not always unambiguous.  While firms may enjoy some 
short-term benefits from tax corruption, it erodes their long-term business integrity 
and strategic capability.  All of these lead to lower economic growth and development 
in the long run. 
Thirdly, and less apparently, tax corruption reduces the policy equity of the tax 
system.  This is because those who enjoy the benefits of tax corruption tend to be 
higher-income individuals.  Their undeclared, illegal income from bribery reduces the 
distributive function of the income tax system, which in turn contributes to increasing 
income inequality in the society.  This is particularly serious in transition economies 
such as Vietnam where there has been a steadily widening gap in the distribution of 
household income. 
Fourthly, perception of tax corruption may have an adverse effect on the tax morale of 
taxpayers (see Rosid, 2017).  This in turn weakens voluntary tax compliance which is 
fundamental to the success of any modern tax system. 
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Finally, perception of tax corruption itself reinforces the public’s perception of general 
corruption which is a serious threat to the political legitimacy of the government, 
including in one-party countries such as Vietnam. 
 
4. EXTENT OF TAX CORRUPTION IN VIETNAM 
There is a range of primary evidence, both anecdotal and documented, that Vietnam 
has remained confronted with widespread tax corruption.  In this section, we start by 
presenting evidence of general corruption in Vietnam.  It is then followed by evidence 
of tax corruption.  Finally, we discuss Vietnam’s tax collection and tax effort.  
Somewhat surprisingly, despite evidence of prevalent tax corruption, Vietnam has 
been performing well in terms of both tax collection and tax effort. 
4.1 Extent of general corruption in Vietnam 
Vietnam performs consistently poorly in terms of international measures of general 
corruption such as the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).  During the period 2011 to 
2016, Vietnam’s CPI level improved slightly from 29 to 33 (0 is highly corrupt and 
100 is highly clean) but its ranking slightly worsened from 112 out of 184 to 113 out 
of 176 (Transparency International, 2017a, 2017c).  The Global Corruption Barometer 
Report (involving about 22,000 people living in 16 countries from 2015 to 2017) 
confirms Vietnam’s poor standing.  Along with Malaysia, Vietnam was the worst 
performing country in the Asia Pacific region (Transparency International, 2017d, p. 
27).  In particular, the government was rated poorly in its efforts to fight corruption 
and bribery was very high. 
While the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators support the above 
findings, an improvement in Vietnam’s control of corruption has been detected.  The 
control of corruption indicator increased steadily from 25 in 2005 to 33 in 2010 and to 
39 in 2015 (on a 0 to 100 scale, with higher values corresponding to better outcomes; 
World Bank, 2017a).  
There is also some domestic evidence of the seriousness of general corruption derived 
from the 2012 survey sponsored by the World Bank and Government Inspectorate of 
Vietnam.  Some interesting results are summarised below (World Bank and 
Government Inspectorate of Vietnam, 2012, pp. 30, 35 and 84 respectively): 
1. after costs of living, corruption is perceived as the second most serious issue 
according to public officials, business and individuals; 
2. at the national level, high-income individuals consider corruption to be more 
serious than average or low-income individuals; 
3. to pressure businesses to make unofficial payments, public officials’ three 
most common practices are intentionally prolonging time, giving no clear 
guidance/finding faults, and sticking to ambiguous regulations. 
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4.2 Extent of tax corruption in Vietnam 
4.2.1 Indirect measure: Paying Taxes indicators 
As previously argued, Paying Taxes indicators derived from the World Bank’s Doing 
Business Report can serve as an indirect measure of tax corruption because there is 
potentially a positive association between tax compliance burden (including dealing 
with tax inspectors’ site visits) and petty tax corruption.  In the 2015 calendar year, 
paying taxes in Vietnam (540 hours) took more than 2.5 times longer than it did in the 
average of the East Asia and Pacific (198 hours) (World Bank, 2017b).11  Similarly, 
the number of tax payments in Vietnam in 2015 (31 times) also far exceeded the 
average of the East Asia and Pacific Region (22.9 times). 
4.2.2 Direct, subjective measure: perception of tax corruption in Vietnam 
Relevant results from the 2012 survey sponsored by the World Bank and Government 
Inspectorate of Vietnam are summarised below: 
1. in terms of perception of the prevalence of corruption, out of 22 sectors, 
customs and taxation rank 3rd and 9th respectively, according to public 
officials, businesses and individuals (World Bank and Government 
Inspectorate of Vietnam, 2012, p. 38); 
2. out of 22 sectors, customs and taxation rank as the 4th and 6th most corrupt 
sectors respectively, according to public officials, businesses and individuals 
(2012, p. 39).  This represents some improvement since customs and taxation 
ranked as the 2nd and 4th most corrupt sectors respectively in the 2005 Survey 
(2012, p. 82); 
3. tax officials are identified by businesses as the public officials creating the 
most difficulties and the ones that have been given the most unofficial 
payments and gifts (2012, pp. 44-45); 
4. in the taxation sector, unofficial payments are actively suggested by 
businesses (almost 90 per cent of all cases) and only in about 10 per cent of 
cases are the unofficial payments demanded (2012, p. 46); 
5. the probability that individuals coming in contact with tax officials must pay a 
large bribe is only 0.5 per cent (not surprising in view of the small role played 
by the income tax in Vietnam) (2012, p. 52); 
6. in the case of individuals making unofficial payments to tax officials, 83 per 
cent are voluntary (2012, p. 55). 
4.2.3 Direct, objective measure of tax corruption in Vietnam 
1. The Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) conducted a 
national survey of more than 2,500 registered businesses in 2015.  The survey 
indicates that 32 per cent of registered businesses in Vietnam had to make 
                                                          
11 This refers to the number of hours that a medium-size company must spend to pay (or withhold) all 
taxes and mandatory contributions in a given year. 
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unofficial payments and 40 per cent believed that their businesses would be 
poorly treated without bribery (VCCI, 2015); 
2. similar but more detailed data on tax corruption are also available from the 
Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) and Surveys of Small and 
Medium Manufacturing Enterprises in Vietnam which have been conducted at 
regular time intervals.  These data more or less confirm the picture painted 
above. 
4.3 Vietnam’s tax collection and tax effort 
For completeness, we now consider Vietnam’s tax collection and tax effort.  Tax 
collection is conventionally defined as the ratio of actual tax revenue to GDP.  Tax 
effort is defined as the ratio of tax collection to taxable capacity where taxable 
capacity refers to the predicted tax collection ratio that can be estimated by regression 
analysis, taking into account a country’s specific, time-varying macroeconomic, 
demographic and institutional features (Le, Moreno-Dodson & Bayraktar, 2012, p. 3). 
Using tax collection and tax effort allows us to rank countries into four separate 
groups: (i) low tax collection (below the median value of the sample), low tax effort 
(below 1); (ii) high tax collection, low tax effort; (iii) low tax collection, high tax 
effort, and (iv) high tax collection, high tax effort.  A priori, a country with 
widespread tax corruption is expected to belong to the low tax effort group.  Similarly, 
a country at a low level of economic development is expected to belong to the low tax 
collection group.  Thus, Vietnam would be expected to belong to the low tax 
collection, low tax effort group. 
Surprisingly, however, Vietnam in fact belongs to the high tax collection, high tax 
effort group (Le et al., 2012, p. 25).  Its average tax collection during the period of 
analysis from 1994 to 2009 was above 18.31 per cent (median value of the tax 
collection in the sample).  That Vietnam has a high tax collection, relative to its GDP 
per capita, is well known.  In fact, Vietnam is known to have one of the highest tax 
collection ratios in the region. 
What is much less known is Vietnam’s tax effort.  During 1994-2009, Vietnam’s 
average tax effort index was 1.31, the highest in East Asia and the 16th highest in the 
world (Le et al., 2012, pp. 19-20).  Vietnam’s remarkable tax effort may lend credence 
to the argument put forward by Flatters and MacLeod (1995, p. 397) that, at least in 
the short run, an efficient collection system can be consistent with petty corruption, 
particularly when there are constraints on government wages or effort is required to 
learn businesses’ tax liabilities. 
 
5. IMPACT OF TAX CORRUPTION ON PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM 
In this section we first provide an overview of private sector development in Vietnam 
and how private businesses in Vietnam deal with their domestic tax obligations.  We 
then review how and why business taxpayers in Vietnam bribe tax inspectors, and how 
tax corruption affects the development of the private sector in Vietnam using four 
dimensions of analysis, namely innovation, investment, employment and per capita 
income. 
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5.1 Private sector development in Vietnam 
Following its reunification in 1975 Vietnam officially adopted a central planning 
economic regime throughout the country.  Such a policy choice, coupled with other 
external difficulties, produced disrupting economic failure in Vietnam.  This 
necessitated the introduction of Doi Moi (economic renovation) in 1986, which saw 
the emergence of the private sector in 1989: agriculture was decollectivised, private 
land use rights established, the majority of prices and the financial sector 
liberalised, many restrictions on private sector activity eliminated and trade and 
investment opened up (see, for example, Tran-Nam, 1999). 
The most significant legal development for the private sector in Vietnam was the 
promulgation of the Enterprise Law which came into effect from 1 January 2000.  
This law replaced the old Private Enterprise Law and Company Law to establish a 
more favourable business environment for the private sector development.  As a result, 
the number of new businesses has since increased very rapidly.  For example, the 
average number of newly registered enterprises per day during the period 2000-05 was 
3.75 times higher than that of the 1991-99 period.  This rising trend has accelerated 
further in recent years.  There were 14,453 newly established enterprises in 2000 and 
this number was estimated to be more than seven times larger in 2010 with 103,170 
new businesses (Business Insides, 2011).  
Because of its rapid growth and contribution to the economy, Vietnam’s private sector 
is considered to hold the key to Vietnam’s future economic success.  Estimates of the 
contribution of the private sector (called the non-state sector) to GDP in Vietnam vary 
from source to source.  According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD, 2014), private enterprises accounted for more than 50 per cent 
of GDP and created 60 per cent of all new jobs in 2013.  Despite its growing 
importance, the private sector in Vietnam remains relatively underdeveloped and faces 
major constraints.  Some of the main problems are briefly discussed below.  
First, private enterprises do not compete on an equal footing with state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), especially in terms of access to land and credit.  Secondly, most of 
private enterprises are of small and medium size.  For example, in 2005 more than 85 
per cent of private enterprises had less than VND 1 billion (about USD 45,000) in total 
capital.  According to the criteria specified in the new Decree 56/2001/ND-CP,12 
about 96 per cent of private enterprises are SMEs although the scale of their operation 
has been expanded in recent years.  Thirdly, as a consequence of being small and 
having little protection from the government, private enterprises are more likely to 
become vulnerable to global economic changes.  A study by Le (2009) suggested that 
the 2009 global economic slowdown affected 57.5 per cent of SMEs in Vietnam while 
only 40.4 per cent of large firms were affected. 
                                                          
12 This decree defines the size of a business (micro, small, medium or large) according to total capital (the 
priority criterion except for the micro category) or average annual number of employees. The threshold 
definitions vary according to the industrial sector (primary, manufacturing and service). For all sectors, a 
business which employs 10 workers or less is said to be micro.  For the primary/manufacturing sectors, a 
business is said to be small (medium) if it has a total capital of VND 20 billion or less (between more 
than VND 20 billion and VND 100 billion), or it employs between more than 10 to 200 (between more 
than 200 and 300) workers. For the service sector, a business is said to be small (medium) if it has a total 
capital of VND 10 billion or less (between more than VND 10 billion and VND 50 billion), or it employs 
between more than 10 to 50 (more than 50 and 100) workers. 
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In spite of the above constraints, the private sector is an engine of innovation and 
hence productivity and efficiency. In particular, estimates by global management 
consulting firm McKinsey found that with one additional unit of capital the private 
sector in Vietnam produces three times the additional revenue compared to SOEs 
(reported in Kim, 2014). In recent years, Vietnam’s efficiency and productivity has 
stagnated and, as a result, its annual GDP growth has slowed to around 5 per cent.  It 
is argued by many researchers that Vietnam’s total factor productivity slowdown has 
been primarily caused by resource misallocation within its economy and there would 
be a very substantial productivity improvement if these distortions were removed 
(Doan et al., 2016, p. 105). 
5.2 Paying taxes in Vietnam 
There are about 10 different types of formal taxes in Vietnam (see 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2017).  However, the main taxes that are relevant to 
businesses are value-added tax (VAT), corporate income tax, excise tax (known in 
Vietnam as special consumption tax), and import and export taxes.  In terms of 
reporting frequency and burden, VAT and corporate income tax are by far the most 
significant business taxes in Vietnam. 
Businesses in Vietnam are generally required to register with the tax administration 
(the General Department of Taxation (GDT) or its city and local offices) within 10 
working days of their formal establishment.  Each registered business will be supplied 
with a business tax registration certificate and a unique tax code.  Businesses then 
have to report their estimated tax obligations by filing certain forms at a certain 
frequency depending on each tax type (VAT, corporate income tax, excise tax, import 
and export taxes).13 There is also a regulation on tax payment deadlines according to 
which enterprises have to pay their taxes arising from the period that corresponds to 
the frequency of tax payment.  Otherwise, they must pay an additional penalty for 
being late in paying tax dues. 
Large enterprises are required to report and pay their VAT liabilities on a monthly 
basis while SMEs do so on a quarterly basis.  There are two ways of calculating VAT, 
namely, the conventional credit-invoice method and the direct method.  Under the 
direct method, VAT tax liability is calculated by multiplying business turnover by a 
VAT rate which varies from industry to industry.  The direct method is only available 
for newly established enterprises or enterprises with turnover below VND 1 billion (or 
USD 45,000). 
In contrast to VAT, corporate income tax in Vietnam is reported and paid to the tax 
authorities on a quarterly basis.  Prior to 2014, enterprises were required to file the tax 
declaration form quarterly in detail and pay that monetary amount.  However, since 
the fourth quarter of 2014, enterprises only have had to estimate their corporate 
income tax liabilities and pay that amount without any additional declaration.  Besides 
the requirement of estimating and paying corporate income tax in each quarter, the 
regulation on corporate income tax also requires that the total of estimated taxes 
should be no less than 20 per cent of total actual tax from the same period.  Otherwise, 
                                                          
13 For household businesses, the tax authority will assign them a presumptive amount of tax liability and 
every household business is required to pay this assigned tax obligation. 
  
eJournal of Tax Research  Tax corruption and private sector development in Vietnam 
304 
 
 
the enterprises will have to pay the difference and an additional amount of penalty for 
the late payment of the difference. 
As expected, the large business sector has played a key role in tax payment in Vietnam.  
However, an examination of tax revenue share by business size from 2000 to 2015 
reveals three interesting trends.14  First, the contribution of the large business sector to 
total tax revenue has declined from about two-thirds (about 66 per cent) in the early 
2000s to about 54 per cent in 2015.  Secondly, the contribution of the medium 
business sector to total tax revenue has remained largely static at about 21 per cent 
over the 2000-15 period.  Thirdly, during the same time period, the total tax revenue 
shares of the micro and small business sectors have more than doubled: from 1.8 to 
3.7 per cent for the micro business sector and from 9.9 to 21 per cent for the small 
business sector. 
As discussed previously, Paying Taxes indicators suggest that a mid-size firm in 
Vietnam typically makes many tax payments to the tax authorities annually and also 
requires many hours to complete its tax affairs.  Further, a Vietnam Enterprise Survey 
conducted by the World Bank (2017c) in 2015 reveals that a very high proportion of 
businesses (42.7 per cent) are visited by or required to meet with tax officials.  The 
number of visits would be directly proportional to the required frequency of tax 
reporting.  Such interactions between business taxpayers and tax auditors can often 
give rise to petty tax briberies. 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is no publicly announced anti-tax 
corruption policy in place despite the perception of widespread petty tax briberies.15 
There may be two reasons for such a lack of specific policies.  First, as discussed in 
section 4.3, Vietnam has been doing reasonably well in terms of both tax collection 
and tax efforts at the national level.  Secondly, Vietnam’s current business culture 
seems to exhibit a high degree of tolerance, or even acceptance, of petty tax briberies.  
This point will be further discussed in the remainder of this section.  
5.3 How and why business taxpayers bribe tax inspectors 
In this section, we briefly report the findings of Dang et al. (2016) and Nguyen, Ho, 
Le and Nguyen (2016). 
The study by Dang et al. (2016) utilised a qualitative research method.  Primary data 
were collected using a questionnaire-based survey.  A random and proportional 
sampling was applied resulting in an effective sample of 525 household businesses in 
eight regions of Vietnam (out of 4.09 million households businesses in 2013). 
Their key findings on tax corruption are as follows: 
1. while the respondents complained that tax officials use their prerogative and 
authority with a view to demanding more tax payments, bribes often result 
                                                          
14 The tax revenue share calculations are based on the annual enterprise surveys conducted by Vietnam’s 
General Statistics Office (GSO, 2016) from 2010 to 2015. The surveys employ a combination of samples 
to collect data on different groups of enterprises. In the most recent survey (2015), about 455,300 
enterprises were covered.  
15 There may be General Department of Taxation internal guidelines or practices for anti-tax corruption 
but the authors are not privilege to this kind of information. 
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from a process of negotiation and collusion rather than extortion.  About 70 
per cent of the respondents indicated that they always or often colluded with 
tax inspectors for mutual benefits.  Correspondingly, only 11 per cent of the 
respondents agreed that tax inspectors often harass them for unofficial 
payments whereas 43 per cent of the respondents disagreed with it; 
2. the scale of corruption is petty.  About 67 per cent of the respondents stated 
that the average amount of unofficial payment per inspection visit is one 
million VND or less (about 45 USD at the April 2017 exchange rate); 
3. tax officials, at the commune and district levels, only received 20 per cent and 
25 per cent positive ratings from the respondents, respectively; 
4. tax corruption is often perceived as a normal cost of doing business.  More 
than 80 per cent of the respondents did not believe that reporting corruption 
would result in any action whereas 13 per cent admitted their guilt (so that a 
bribe would be the lesser penalty than a fine). 
The theoretical framework of the study of Nguyen, Ho, Le and Nguyen (2016) was 
based on the institutional theory, rent-seeking approach and resource-based view.  It 
utilised a mixed-modes research method in which the quantitative analysis involved 
formal hypothesis-testing using regression analyses.  Data were derived from firm-
level data for 2009-11 drawn from the Provincial Competitiveness Index, conducted 
by the Vietnam Competitiveness Initiatives and the VCCI, and the annual enterprise 
survey, conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam. 
Their main findings on costs and benefits of tax corruption are: 
1. institutional view: firms engage in corrupt activities only to follow the ‘rules 
of the game’.  There is a positive relationship between the probability that a 
firm makes unofficial payments and: (a) the unofficial payments made by 
other firms in the district; (b) the firm’s belief that other firms make unofficial 
payments, and (c) the firm’s belief that negotiations with tax officials are 
important; 
2. institutional view: the hypothesis that unofficial payments are positively 
associated with transactional benefits of young firms cannot be supported.  
There is some evidence that unofficial payments seem to increase with the 
number of visits and the length of each visit for young firms; 
3. rent-seeking view: unofficial payments are positively related to growth for 
firms operating in restricted areas; 
4. resource-based view: unofficial payments have a negative relationship with 
firm efficiency.  This harmful effect is normally hidden and not well 
recognised by firms. 
5.4 Firm innovation 
In the study by Nguyen, Doan, Nguyen and Tran-Nam (2016), three aspects of 
innovation were recognised: new product, new process and modification of an existing 
product.  The research utilised a quantitative analysis that involved instrumental 
variable regression analyses to deal with the endogeneity problem.  Secondary data 
were derived from firm-level data for 2005-11 drawn from the Surveys of Small and 
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Medium Manufacturing Enterprises, conducted jointly by Vietnam’s Central Institute 
for Economic Management and the Danish International Development Agency. 
Key findings on firm innovation: 
1. the findings support the ‘greasing-the-wheels’ hypothesis of corruption; 
2. unofficial payments appear to have a positive and significant effect on general 
innovation, product innovation, product improvement and, especially, process 
innovation.  While the findings are controversial, it is consistent with the 
‘greasing-the-wheels’ hypothesis of corruption and other previous studies.  In 
the absence of formal and transparent institutions, unofficial payments can 
provide the certainty needed by businesses to innovate. 
5.5 Firm performance 
The study by Dang (2016) examined three dimensions of firm performance: 
investment, employment and per capita income.  His research analysis was 
quantitative, involving a HausmanTaylor estimation method to deal with the 
endogeneity problem.  His data were taken firm-level data 2006-12 drawn from the 
annual enterprise survey, conducted by the GSO, and the Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Surveys, conducted by the GSO with technical assistance from the World 
Bank.  
His key findings on firm performance can be summarised as follows: 
1. the findings support the ‘sanding-the-wheels’ hypothesis of corruption.  The 
prevalence and burden of corruption have negative and significant impacts on 
investment, employment and household income.  Thus, tax corruption can 
substantially undermine the socioeconomic development of the provinces; 
2. a 1 per cent drop in the prevalence of corruption would increase private 
investment by 3.7 per cent, private employment by 1 per cent and per capita 
income by 1.5 per cent; 
3. a 1 per cent drop in the burden of corruption would increase private 
investment by 6.4 per cent, private employment by 1.8 per cent and per capita 
income by 2.3 per cent. 
Overall, the empirical findings of the above studies suggest that the impact of tax 
corruption on private sector is indeed mixed as both the ‘sanding-the-wheels’ and 
‘greasing-the-wheels’ hypotheses can be supported in different contexts.  The 
presence of the vicious circle of tax corruption, and taxpayers’ myopic view on the 
short-term benefits of engaging in tax corruption are serious challenges to policy-
makers who are genuinely committed to fighting corruption. 
 
6. MOVING FORWARD: SOME POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The present article has attempted to make a contribution to the under-researched field 
of tax corruption in general and tax corruption in Vietnam in particular.  It has 
discussed the meaning and types, measurement, causes and consequences of tax 
corruption, presented the evidence on the extent of tax corruption and reviewed the 
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findings on impact of tax corruption on private sector development, primarily in the 
Vietnamese context. 
The evidence suggests that Vietnam faces a serious tax corruption problem.  Petty tax 
corruption is prevalent, resilient and damaging.  Yet the fight against tax corruption to 
develop a healthier tax culture is such a difficult one for two key reasons.  First, at the 
macro level, Vietnam appears to do very well in terms of tax collection and tax effort.  
Thus, there is little incentive for tax authorities and tax administrators to move away 
from the current practice.  Secondly, from the business perspective, corruption has 
created a vicious circle.  Firms may lose sight of their business integrity and long-term 
strategic capacity because of their myopic, perceived benefits of petty bribes that 
provide some short-term certainties in the presence of inefficient governance. 
To effectively fight tax corruption in Vietnam, a suite of both generic and specific 
reform measures are urgently needed.  Like other transition countries, Vietnam needs 
to push forward with its structural reform.  The generic structural reform consists of 
several dimensions such as marketisation, rule of law and democratisation.  These are 
clearly beyond the scope of both tax policy-makers and administrators, so they will 
not be further elaborated upon here. 
Tax-specific proposals are within the control of tax policy-makers and administrators.  
In the long term, tax culture is continuously evolving so there should be a deliberate 
program of education of taxpayers, especially business taxpayers, and the training of 
tax collectors/inspectors.  Needless to say, such an education and training program 
should be accompanied by a gradual reform of the salary structure of the public sector. 
The short and medium-term proposals basically call for the modernisation and 
simplification of the Vietnamese tax system.  The proposed reform measures are set 
out as follows: 
1. first, Vietnam’s tax law should be made more certain and unambiguous so that 
tax inspectors have fewer discretions in interpreting the tax law.  The tax law 
should also be simplified in order to eliminate an important source of 
corruption.  There should also be a greater effort in applying self-assessment 
in accordance with international practice; 
2. secondly, the tax administration process should be simplified so that there are 
fewer site visits by tax inspectors and so that businesses can comply with their 
tax obligations more easily.  In particular, there should be a more vigorous 
push for a greater application of digital technology to minimise face-to-face 
interactions between business taxpayers and tax inspectors;  
3. thirdly, entrance to the General Department of Taxation should be based more 
rigorously on transparent, merit-based examinations.  As a supplement, there 
should be more regular rotation of staff (from one department to another, or 
from one sector to another, or from one district to another); 
4. fourthly, consideration should be given to establishment of a more accessible 
mechanism of independent tax dispute resolution through which taxpayers 
who disagree with the GDT can voice their disputes; 
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5. fifthly and finally, the GDT should consider introducing a formal measure of 
its productivity as a way to monitor and improve its operation and 
performance. 
The above proposed measures can only work if there is a parallel effort to break the 
vicious circle of tax corruption among business taxpayers.  This typically requires a 
carrot and stick approach.  As mentioned previously, an important component of such 
a strategy is a thoughtful program to educate both tax officials and taxpayers about the 
benefits of a healthier tax culture.  High-profile prosecutions of a few corrupted tax 
officials would also be helpful in turning the tax paying culture around.  Another 
helpful development, which may not be entirely within the control of the GDT, is for 
the Ministry of Finance to guide and assist the progress and growth of a wave of 
capable and law-abiding tax practitioners in Vietnam. 
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